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Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Ausgru¨ndungen aus Hochschulen, sogenannte akademische Spin-Offs, haben
in den letzten Jahren große Beachtung in der Innovationspolitik gefunden. In
ganz Europa wurden Programme entwickelt, die unternehmerische Ta¨tigkei-
ten von Akademikern fo¨rdern sollen. Aufgrund hoher Innovationsaktivita¨ten
von akademischen Spin-Offs verspricht sich die Politik eine Sta¨rkung der re-
gionalen und nationalen Innovationsfa¨higkeit, was die Wettbewerbsfa¨higkeit
erho¨hen soll und damit nicht zuletzt fu¨r wirtschaftliches Wachstum sorgt.
Entgegen der weit verbreiteten Ansicht, dass akademische Spin-Offs di-
rekt aus der Hochschule heraus gegru¨ndet werden, findet die Gru¨ndung der
meisten Spin-Offs erst mehrere Jahre nach dem Verlassen der wissenschaft-
lichen Einrichtung statt. Eine Umfrage unter rund 20.000 neugegru¨ndeten
Unternehmen im Jahre 2001, die auch die Datengrundlage dieser Arbeit ist,
konnte zeigen, dass 50 Prozent aller deutschen Spin-Offs erst mehr als 4 Jahre
nach dem Ausscheiden aus der Wissenschaft gegru¨ndet werden. Trotz dieser
zeitlichen Verzo¨gerung tragen diese Spin-Offs wesentlich zumWissenstransfer
bei. Diese Tatsache ist zwar nicht u¨berraschend, aber recht neu, da die Mo¨g-
lichkeit einer
”
spa¨ten“ Gru¨ndung in der Literatur zwar bekannt ist, jedoch
meist ignoriert wird.
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, ob Spin-Offs, von denen eine ho¨here In-
tensita¨t des Wissenstransfers angenommen wird, schneller gegru¨ndet werden
und inwiefern eine Ausgru¨ndung komplementa¨re Fa¨higkeiten des Gru¨nders
erfordert. Die Ergebnisse einer Verweildaueranalyse zeigen, dass Spin-Offs
mit einer ho¨heren Wissenstransferintensita¨t zeitlich na¨her an der Wissen-
schaft gegru¨ndet werden. Des Weiteren ist die Zeitspanne zwischen Wissen-
schaft und Gru¨ndung fu¨r jene Spin-Offs geringer, die in Teams gegru¨ndet
werden oder deren Gru¨nder nicht nur einer wissenschaftlichen Fachrichtung
angeho¨ren. Dies besta¨rkt die These, dass fu¨r eine Ausgru¨ndung ein breites
Spektrum an Fa¨higkeiten notwendig ist, die zueinander in komplementa¨ren
Beziehungen stehen.
Executive Summary
The creation of academic spin-offs has received great attention in innovation
policy for the last couple of years. Throughout Europe policy programmes
have been introduced to stimulate entrepreneurial activities of academic per-
sons. Academic spin-offs are assigned to be highly innovative, and thus help
to strengthen a regions or even a countries innovative ability, improve com-
petitiveness and finally foster economic growth.
The prevalent view is that spin-offs are mostly established directly after
leaving the academic institution. However a survey of around 20.000 newly-
founded firms carried out in Germany in 2001, which is also the data base for
the following paper, revealed that 50 percent of all German academic spin-
offs founded between 1996 and 2001 were established 4 years or more after
the founder left his academic institution. Despite this time-lag all spin-offs
contributed to technology and knowledge transfer. The contribution could
be inferred by the method academic spin-offs were identified.
This fact is not surprising, but rather new as the possibility of ”late”
founding was known but mostly ignored in the spin-off literature.
This paper focuses on the contribution of the existence of complementar-
ities in skills and the intensity of technology and knowledge transfer, to the
time which elapses after the founder has left the academic institution.
The results of a duration analysis made in this paper suggest that spin-offs
with a higher intensity of knowledge transfer are established closer to the time
directly after leaving university. Furthermore, spin-offs which are founded in
teams have significantly shorter time-lags than those established by a single
founder. Additionally, foundation is accelerated if the founder(s) studied
certain combinations of academic subjects rather than a single subject. This
supports the presumption that in order to establish a firm a broad spectrum
of complementary skills is necessary which can either be obtained by market
and business experience of a single founder or by forming a team.
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Abstract
For academic spin-offs I analyze the length of time between the
founder’s leaving of academia and the establishment of his firm. Tech-
nology transfer can take place even years after leaving the mother in-
stitution. A duration analysis reveals that a longer time-lag is caused
by the necessity of assembling complementary skills, either by acqui-
sition by a single founder or by searching for suitable team members.
Furthermore, new ventures are established earlier if the intensity of
technology transfer is high, the founders have access to university in-
frastructure, or received informal support by former colleagues.
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1 Introduction
Technology transfer, i.e. the commercialization of public research results, can
take place through many different channels. One important channel is the for-
mation of new firms which are based on research, knowledge or skills created
in a public research institution1. Bercovitz and Feldmann (2006) identify the
establishment of those firms, known as academic spin-offs, as one of the core
mechanisms of university technology transfer besides sponsored research, li-
censing out of R&D results and hiring of students or researchers. Technology
transfer can also proceed through other channels such as adoption of tacit
knowledge or publications.
For licensing, Jensen and Thursby (2001) found that inventions are so ”em-
bryonic” at the time of licensing that it is not known whether the invention
will become successfully commercialized. Most inventions require further de-
velopment. In this development process inventor cooperation is crucial for
commercial success. However, because of a moral-hazard problem with re-
gard to inventor effort, there would be no further development unless the
inventor’s return and the licensee’s output are linked. Jensen and Thursby
explicitly propose royalties or equity participation as possible solutions to
the moral-hazard problem. Academic spin-offs might be another solution to
that kind of moral-hazard problem in technology transfer.
Other studies analyze why transfer channels often suffer from a low speed
of technology transfer. Adams (1990) shows that there is an average lag of
20 years from the publication of academic research to its application by in-
dustry, whereas Mansfield (1995) finds that for a firm’s product or process
innovations, which could not have been developed in the absence of recent
academic research, 7 years on average elapse between the finding of the rel-
evant academic research results and the commercial introduction of the new
product or process.
1Public research institutions include besides higher education institutes (e.g. universi-
ties or technical colleges) also public research organisations (e.g. Fraunhofer Society, Max
Planck Society). In the following university, academia and public research institutions are
synonyms.
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There is a prevalent belief that academic spin-offs are established when
the founder is employed at university or directly after he has left the academic
institution. In a nutshell, Carayannis et al. (1998, p.3), state the naive view:
”Typically, an employee [. . . ] leaves the parent organization, taking along a
technology that serves as entry ticket for the new company in a high-tech
industry.” In fact there is no clear definition of an academic spin-off. Some
definitions even explicitly state that academic spin-offs are only those new
ventures which have been founded during the time at the research institution
or immediately after leaving science (e.g. Pirnay et al., 2003). But substantial
technology transfer from academia can take place even years after a founder
has left university as Egeln et al. (2003a) show. Early research even included
those ventures which were not founded immediately as Pirney cites:
”Roberts considered a venture as a MIT spin-off even if there was a lag of
up to nine years between leaving MIT or an affiliate labs and starting the
company as long as the technological base of the company was related to
research at the lab at the time of employment. (McMullan and Vesper, 1987,
p.356)”
Although it is well known that spin-off companies can be started years after
having left university, analysis is mostly restricted to those whose founders
are still members of the university or have very recently left (e.g. Druilhe
and Garnsey, 2004). In a first study for Germany, which tried to reveal both
the scope of academic spin-off activities in research and knowledge-intensive
industries as well as characteristics of academic spin-off firms, Egeln et al.
(2003a) found that one in three spin-offs in research and knowledge-intensive
industries that are based on new research results and half of all spin-offs
in research and knowledge-intensive industries that are based on academic
competencies acquired at universities are established more than five years
after the founder has left the academic institution.
This paper aims to analyze the factors that drive this time-lag in the
establishment of academic spin-offs. A special focus is put on the existence
of complementarities in skills needed to establish spin-off ventures as well as
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on the impact of the intensity of technology transfer. In a duration analysis
I will show that a longer time-lag is caused by the necessity of assembling
complementary skills, either via learning by a single founder or by searching
for suitable team members. Furthermore, I find that new ventures are estab-
lished earlier if the intensity of technology transfer is high, the founders have
access to university infrastructure, or informal support by former colleagues.
The paper is organized as follows: This introduction is followed by a
short literature review of existing empirical spin-off literature. After that the
hypotheses for the empirical analysis are developed, followed by section 4
where the data set is described. Section 5 carries out the empirical analysis
and section 6 summarizes the findings and concludes the paper.
2 Literature review
The spin-off literature covers a wide field of different topics. Many studies
investigate the spin-off phenomenon at the university level. These studies
often take a policy view and ask how a region or university can enhance and
facilitate spin-off activities (e.g., O’Shea et al., 2005; Powers and McDougall,
2005; Clarysse et al., 2004; Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Lockett et al., 2003;
Franklin et al., 2001; Steffensen et al., 1999). Often benefits and effects for
academia are also investigated. A study of Bray and Lee (2004) found, for
example, that holding equity in university spin-offs creates, on average, a ten
times higher income for US universities than licensing.
On the micro level, characteristics, development and performance of aca-
demic spin-offs (Walter et al., 2006; Mu¨ller, 2006) are examined. Besides
employment growth, turnover growth, and fund raising (especially venture
capital funding), survival is frequently examined. The patent stock at found-
ing as well as the patent scope, for example, significantly increases an aca-
demic spin-off’s probability of survival (Shane and Stuart, 2002; Nerkar and
Shane, 2003).
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Rothaermel and Thursby (2005b) found that the number of backward patent
citations increases the total amount of funds raised, increases the probabil-
ity of venture capital financing and lowers the firm’s probability of failure.
Moreover, strong university linkages of spin-offs located in an incubator to the
incubator-sponsoring university reduce the probability of failure but retard
timely graduation as well (Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005a).
In some studies characteristics and performance measures of spin-offs are
compared to those of non-academic start-ups. Egeln et al. (2003b) for exam-
ple found that employment in the year of establishment is higher in academic
spin-offs than in other ventures of research and knowledge-intensive indus-
tries. Furthermore, employment growth of academic spin-offs in the first
years after the establishment is considerably higher than the employment
growth of other new ventures. Dahlstrand (1997) even found that, after an
initial ten-year period, spin-offs grew significantly faster than non-spin-offs.
But evidence is mixed: Ensley and Hmieleski (2005) showed that university-
based start-ups perform significantly lower than their independent counter-
parts in terms of revenue growth and cash flow. Similarly Egeln et al. (2007)
found that Austrian academic spin-offs have higher probabilities of surviving
but do not perform better in terms of employment or turnover growth.
The first typology was provided by Pirnay et al. (2003), summarizing
prevalent definitions of spin-off activities.
The location decision of academic spin-offs was investigated in detail by
Egeln et al. (2004). Theory suggests that in order to benefit from knowledge-
spillover effects spin-offs should locate close to their incubator institution.
Egeln et al. (2004) found instead that proximity to incubators is less im-
portant for location decisions of German academic spin-offs. Fewer studies
examined the spin-off process (Ndonzuau et al., 2002), which help to explain
the differences in the time that elapses after the founder has left university.
Time is a rather disregarded factor in the literature of technology transfer,
especially in the spin-off literature. Markman et al. (2005) do explicitly
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focus on the time factor. They investigate the determinants and effects of
innovation speed in university licensing measured as the time elapsed between
the disclosure of an invention and the licensing of that invention.
Very few studies give some hints about the impact of being still employed
in university after founding a company on firm performance, but they are
based on a very small sample size of eight or twelve spin-offs (Olofsson and
Wahlbin, 1984; Doutriaux, 1987). To the best of my knowledge there are no
studies which have investigated the determinants of the length of the time
period that elapses after the founder(s) had left university.
3 Hypothesis development
As technology transfer by means of establishing a company is a complex
process with different stages there may be many factors influencing the time
that elapses between leaving university and the establishment of a spin-off.
Theoretical explanations on why some founders of academic spin-offs es-
tablished their firm later than others can be borrowed from the theory devel-
oped by Lazear (2004) who explains which people are more likely to establish
a business. Lazear’s theoretical model states that an entrepreneur has to be
jack-of-all-trades. This means that an entrepreneur is less specialized and
more a generalist as he must have, at least on a basic level, some knowledge
of a wide variety of business areas. Hence, people who tend to become en-
trepreneurs should have a particular strategy on how to invest in their own
human capital. Those whose initial skill endowment is unbalanced should
invest in skills in which they are weak. Even those with balanced skills
will invest in their skills if the prospective income gain exceeds the marginal
costs. Lazear’s theory is therefore based on skill complementarities which are
especially relevant for entrepreneurs.
If complementarities actually exist, for example, between engineering and
management skills, founders have to acquire a whole set of competencies or
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search for other specialized team members. A scientist with an unbalanced
skill profile has to first acquire complementary skills like management skills
before establishing his own venture becomes worthwhile. This is time con-
suming and affects the length of time between the drop out of academia and
the point in time when the venture was established. After leaving university
a scientist with a balanced skill profile will therefore venture more quickly
than the scientist with an unbalanced skill profile. This allows an adoption
of Lazear’s theory to explain the founding time-lag of academic spin-offs,
because we can examine actual new ventures. Complementarities in skills
cause longer time-lags. As acquiring a whole set of knowledge and searching
for other specialized team members could be characterized as substitutes, the
formation of a team of founders is a useful alternative to acquiring the needed
complementary skills. Furthermore, to venture more quickly it is necessary
that either a single founder or a team demonstrates a skill profile that is
characterized by a combination of skills rather than by specialization in one
single subject. Thus the first hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: Spin-offs established in teams have shorter time-lags
between the drop out of academia and the establishment of the spin-off.
Hypothesis 1b: A combination of different skills leads to shorter time-
lags than a homogenous skill profile.
Concerning the technology or knowledge they transfer, academic spin-offs
are quite heterogenous. With regard to the type of knowledge transferred one
can distinguish between research results, new developed methods, and skills
acquired at university. These types differ primarily in their specificity of
knowledge. While the new research results usually have a quite narrow ap-
plication range for commercial exploitation, the scope is wider for methods
and widest for competencies acquired in academia. It is reasonable to assume
that the time which elapses after leaving university is highly influenced by
the type of knowledge which is transferred. An example will help to illus-
trate that idea: When the establishment is based on new research findings a
spin-off should be founded closer to the time of leaving academia than when
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the establishment is based on specific skills acquired at university. The find-
ing of new research results usually opens a ”window of opportunity” during
which the opportunity has to be exploited before the window is ”closed” by
competitors. This window of opportunity might be rather short depending
on the technology developed. The exploitation of skills acquired in academia
will in general have a window of opportunity which is much larger than that
of successful exploitation of new research results. Hence for securing the com-
petitive advantage the time factor is of more interest when research results
are sought to be transferred in marketable products or services than skills.
Because highly specific knowledge requires more effort to transfer, the
transfer of research results obviously can be claimed to have a higher inten-
sity of technology transfer which again lessens the ”window of opportunity”.
The second hypothesis can therefore be formulated in terms of intensity of
technology transfer.
Hypothesis 2: Spin-offs with a higher intensity of technology transfer
have shorter time-lags.
4 Database and Descriptive Statistics
For the following empirical analysis a survey of more than 20,000 German
start-ups in research and knowledge-intensive industries founded between
1996 and 2000 is used as data set. In 2001 a computer-assisted telephone
survey was conducted in order to estimate both the number of academic spin-
offs in Germany and to identify the core characteristics of academic spin-offs.
The underlying population from which a stratified random sample was drawn
consists of all the new ventures in research and knowledge-intensive indus-
tries2 which had been established between 1996 and 2000. Stratification
2Research and knowledge-intensive industries include cutting edge technology (e.g.
manufacturing of pharmaceutical products), high technology (e.g. manufacturing of chem-
icals), technological services (e.g. telecommunications) and knowledge-intensive services
(e.g. business consulting). A classification based on NACE codes is provided in the ap-
pendix.
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criteria are the industry, the year of establishment, and the type of region
where the start-up was established. Data concerning all start-up companies
in Germany could have been retrieved from the Mannheim Foundation Panel
which is built upon firm level data made available by Creditreform3.
One major advantage of that survey is the way academic spin-offs are iden-
tified. However, instead of asking technology-transfer offices about spin-off
activity at their research institutions, founders themselves were asked about
their academic background. Technology-transfer offices and heads of insti-
tutions might both have limited information about the amount of spin-off
activities at their institutions. In addition they lack information about the
characteristics of the founder or the start-ups. Especially for spin-offs that
are established years after the founders have left university, the institutions
will hardly be informed.
During the interview each start-up was asked about the academic back-
ground of the founders and the relevance of academic skills, new scientific
methods and results of the founders’ own research activities in the estab-
lishment process. Academic spin-offs are then those foundations of persons
with an academic background (students, graduates and researches) which
classified academic skills, new scientific methods or own research results as
indispensable for the establishment of their firm.
According to these statements three types of spin-offs could be distin-
guished which differ in their intensity of technology transfer.
Research-based transfer spin-offs: New research results developed by at
least one of the founders must have been indispensable to the creation
of the firm (highest intensity of technology transfer).
Method-based transfer spin-offs: New scientific methods, which at least
one of the founders acquired during the time at the public research insti-
3Creditreform is Germany’s major credit rating agency, collecting information about
almost all German firms for the purpose of providing information about a firm’s financial
standing (more detailed information on the Mannheim Foundation Panels is provided by
Almus et al. (2000)).
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tute, must have been indispensable to the creation of the firm (medium
intensity of technology transfer).
Competence spin-offs: Merely specific skills, which at least one of the
founders acquired during the time at the public research institute, must
have been indispensable to the creation of the firm (lower intensity of
technology transfer).
As this paper aims to investigate the influence of complementarities in
skills and the intensity of technology transfer on the length of time which
has elapsed between leaving the public research institution and founding
the company, the sample is restricted to those firms which could name the
institutions they come from and which could provide information on the year
when university was left.
Using the above described methodology, out of 20,241 observations of new
ventures in research- and knowledge-intensive industries, 1,810 spin-offs can
be identified and the time their founders needed to venture can be analyzed.
Out of these 1,810 academic spin-offs the sample contains 15% research-based
transfer spin-offs, 23% method-based spin-offs and 62% competence spin-offs.
Furthermore, information about the public research institutions, where
the founders come from, the subjects studied by the founders, and some gen-
eral facts about the firm (for example, start-up size, turnover, employment,
R&D activities) were retrieved during the interview.
For all spin-offs, whose founders had, up to the time of the survey, already
left the public research institute, a kernel density estimation for the time
which elapsed between leaving academia and establishment of the spin-off was
calculated using the Epanechnikov kernel function. The corresponding graph
of the kernel density estimation and the histogram of the time-lag is displayed
in Figure 1. The time can even take negative values. This identifies academic
spin-offs, in which at least one of the founders was still in academia after the
venture was established. The univariate kernel density estimation shows that
the distribution of the time to venture is positively skewed. Although the
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maximum of the density function is roughly around zero, a high density of
time-lags of over 5 years signals that spin-off establishments beyond a time-
lag of 5 years are rather probable. One can also see that even time-lags
beyond 10 years are relatively probable.
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Figure 1: Histogram and kernel density estimation of the time to venture
Source: ZEW Spin-Off Survey 2001, author’s calculactions.
The knowledge and technology transfer via the spin-off establishment
is therefore not restricted to those who establish their firm directly after
leaving university. Even many years after leaving a public research institute,
knowledge and technology transfer may still take place.
Furthermore, descriptive statistics about the time-lag between leaving
university and spin-off establishment are given in Table 1. Only about 33%
of the spin-offs were established with a time-lag below one year, as one can
conclude from the fourth column. For ventures, which were founded a year
or more after the founder left university, the period of time which elapsed in
between was, on average, around 11 years.
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Table 1: Time-lag between leaving university and spin-off establishment
Type of spin-off
time-lag
research-transfer
spin-off
method-transfer
spin-off
competence
spin-off
all
founder(s) still in
science
41%A,B 28%B,C 21%A,C 25%
established in the
year of leaving
10%A 10%C 6%A,C 8%
mean time-lag 10.1 (7) 10.3 (7) 11.2 (9) 10.9 (8)
Notes: Median in parentheses; A: significant differences between research-transfer spin-offs and com-
petence spin-offs, B: significant differences between research-transfer spin-offs and method-transfer
spin-offs, C: significant differences between method-transfer spin-offs and competence spin-offs.
Source: ZEW Spin-Off Survey 2001, author’s calculations.
Moreover the descriptive statistics reveal substantial differences in the
founding time-lag between the different spin-off types. A spin-off with higher
intensity of technology transfer seems to be established closer to the year
university was left.
Descriptive statistics on foundation and founder characteristics are pre-
sented in Table 2. Around 60 percent of all spin-offs were founded in teams.
Spin-offs can be further distinguished by the founders’ positions in the
respective research institutes. If none of the founders has been a researcher
the spin-off is named student spin-off. While 35 percent of research-based
transfer spin-offs were founded by persons who have only been students at
the research institute, the fraction for method-based transfer spin-offs and
competence spin-offs is much higher (64 percent and 75 percent respectively).
Overall 66 percent of the spin-offs had no researchers in the founding team.
In the survey founders were also asked which motivations apply to their
decision to start a firm. The overwhelming majority stated that working
independently and self-determined was one reason for firm formation (92
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percent). Improving one’s personal income prospectives was also named by
the majority of respondents (64 percent). Another reason to found the firm,
which applies to 49 percent of all firms, was a specific corporate demand for
products or services. To use the economic potential provided by research
results is the case for 17 percent of all competence spin-offs compared to
55 percent of research-based transfer spin-offs. Better career options than
in academia is only a minor motivation for competence spin-offs (9 percent)
whereas career options seem to be more common for research-based trans-
fer spin-offs (24 percent). That difference, as well as the difference in the
exploitation of the economic potential provided by the research results, are
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Furthermore, it can be seen from Table 2 what share of spin-offs received
different kinds of support from their academic institutions prior to firm for-
mation. The different kinds of assistance vary from courses, infrastructure
and individual legal and business advice, to the establishment of contacts and
encouragement and support from colleagues. Around 6 percent made use of
courses and teaching events relevant for the founding process while 4 percent
received individual legal or business advice. For these types of support from
academic institutions before founding no significant differences between the
spin-off types can be found. Provision of infrastructure (offices, secretarial
service, access to laboratories etc.), establishment of contacts and encourage-
ment and support from colleagues was the more frequently used the higher
the intensity of technology transfer. 26 percent of research-based transfer
spin-offs got support from colleagues while only 16 percent of method-based
transfer spin-offs and 10 percent of competence spin-offs received that kind
of support. This applies for provision of infrastructure and establishment
of contacts, too. 12 percent of research-based transfer spin-offs, but only
5 percent and 3 percent of method-based transfer spin-offs and competence
spin-offs respectively, were supported with infrastructure. Contacts were es-
tablished for 10 percent of all research-based transfer spin-offs, but just for 7
percent (5 percent) of all method-based transfer spin-offs (competence spin-
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offs). The highlighted differences can be explained by a selection process of
the supporting university because high-potential start-up ideas are supported
preferentially. Furthermore, the differences are significant at least against the
one-sided alternative.
The founder(s) studied mostly one single subject (76 percent). Subject
combinations are divided into four categories: a combination of natural sci-
ence and engineering, a combination of natural science and business, a combi-
nation of engineering and business, and other combinations. With a fraction
of about 13 percent other combinations are the most frequent category. The
corresponding fractions of the other categories classified by the spin-off type
can be inferred from Table 2 as well. Even if an spinoff was not established
by a team of founders, the founder could have studied various subjects. In
fact, 4% of all single founders show a combination of subjects. The other way
around, team foundations do not necessarily show a combination of different
subjects.
Research and knowledge intensive industries can be further subclassified
into six industries: the cutting edge technology industry, the high technology
industry, the software industry, technological services, knowledge intensive
services and other manufacturing industries. The majority of the firms op-
erate in technological services (38 percent), closely followed by knowledge
intensive services (37 percent). Altogether 7 percent operate in cutting edge
technologies, while the fraction of research-based transfer spin-offs operating
in cutting edge technology is almost twice as high (13 percent).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Type of spin-off
variable
research-
based
transfer
spin-off
method-
based
transfer
spin-off
competence
spin-off
all
team 57% 58% 61% 60%
student 35% 64% 75% 66%
Motivations to start the firm
economic potentials 55% 31% 17% 26%
self-determined working 88% 93% 93% 92%
income 60% 66% 65% 64%
career 24% 13% 9% 12%
demand 50% 51% 48% 49%
Received support from academic institutions
courses 6% 8% 5% 6%
infrastructure 12% 5% 3% 5%
advisory 5% 5% 3% 4%
contacts 10% 7% 5% 6%
colleagues 26% 16% 10% 14%
Academic subjects
nat & engin 4% 4% 4% 4%
nat & business 5% 5% 4% 5%
engin & business 1% 4% 3% 3%
other combination 11% 11% 14% 13%
single subject 78% 77% 75% 76%
Industry
cutting edge technology 13% 4% 6% 7%
high technology 7% 4% 5% 5%
software 9% 9% 8% 8%
technological services 34% 40% 38% 38%
knowledge intensive services 30% 38% 38% 37%
other manufacturing 7% 5% 5% 5%
Notes: Cutting edge technologies (high technologies) are those sectors defined by Grupp and Legler
(2000) after 4 digit NACE classification in which the average R&D intensity is above 8% (3.5%-8%).
Source: ZEW Spin-Off Survey 2001, author’s calculations.
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5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Estimation Method
In order to analyze the time to the occurrence of an event it is appropriate
to deviate from the normality assumption and use techniques of survival
analysis. To estimate the effect of certain covariates xj on the hazard rate
h(t|xj), which is the instantaneous rate of failure4 at a given time t or the age
specific failure-rate, most commonly proportional hazard models, expressed
by
h(t|xj) = h0(t) exp(xjβx),
are used.
As the baseline hazard h0(t)
5 is time-dependent, but not influenced by the
covariates, each individual (firm) faces the same baseline hazard. Because of
that, comparing subject j to subject m, one obtains from the model
h(t|xj)
h(t|xm) =
exp(xjβx)
exp(xmβx)
,
which is called hazard ratio. The hazard ratio is constant, assuming that the
covariates xj and xm do not change over time.
From the formulation of the hazard rate it is easy to see that for a binary
covariate xk shifting from zero to one the hazard ratio is
h(t|xj, xk = 1)
h(t|xj, xk = 0) =
exp(xjβx + 1 · βk)
exp(xjβx)
= exp(βk),
which gives the coefficients an easy interpretation. As a semi-parametric
estimation method proposed by Cox (1972) imposes no restrictions on the
4The risk of failure is the risk of the occurrence of the event under investigation, i.e.
here the ”risk” of establishing the spin-off.
5The baseline hazard is the hazard rate of observations with zero covariates. The
covariates shift the baseline hazard multiplicatively.
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shape of the baseline hazard and therefore allows the baseline hazard to be
as flexible as possible, Cox regression is used for this analysis.
Using survival analysis the time under investigation is not allowed to
take negative or zero values. Therefore, concerning the dependent variable
no difference is made between all spin-off establishments which are founded
in the time when the founder was still in academia. These observations are
assumed to enter and ”fail” immediately and a time value of 0.1 was assigned
to them. Similarly all firms whose founders left academia in the year of
establishment (original time value of zero) got a new time-value of 0.2. For
all other observations (these with a time-lag) the time-lag was measured
in years. This procedure is possible because the Cox proportional hazards
model is sensitive only to the order of the failure events. Thus as long as
one keeps the earliest failure events as occurring first, the results will remain
unchanged.
In order to test Hypothesis 2 the intensity of technology transfer is mea-
sured by the different spin-off types. The effect of complementarities in skills
(Hypotheses 1a and 1b) is captured by a dummy variable which indicates
if the spin-off was established by a team and a set of dummy variables
which display the combination of subjects the founder(s) studied, provided
the founder(s) did not study a single subject6.
But the time lag between leaving university and establishing the firm can
be influenced by several other factors. To capture these effects a wide set of
further dummy variables is included in the analysis. These dummies portray
if the founders were students or researchers during their time in academia,
which motivations had driven the establishment, what kind of support the
founders received from their academic institution, and to which economic
sector the spin-off belongs.
Tests based on Schoenfeld residuals (Schoenfeld, 1982; Grambsch and Th-
erneau, 1994) reveal some violations of the proportional hazard assumption
6These are different aspects as one founder could have studied several subjects of a
team of founders could have studied the same subjects.
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concerning the covariates method-based spin-off and student. Therefore an-
other model (model B) is estimated with the same specification as in the
original model (model A) but stratified by the variables method-based spin-
off and student. In contrast to the standard Cox model, which assumes
proportional hazards for each explanatory variable, a stratified model makes
it possible to control for the effect of a certain variable without making a pro-
portional hazard assumption for that variable (Parmar and Machin, 2006).
Stratification allows for different baseline hazards for each of the possible
categories7 but constrains the coefficients to be the same. The model is now
relaxed in favour of
h(t|xj) = h0i(t)exp(xjβx), if j is in group i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Tests on the proportional hazard assumption do not reveal further viola-
tions. Because analysis in model B is stratified by the variables method-based
spin-off and student the effect of these variables is now absorbed by different
shapes of the baseline hazard and no coefficients are estimated.
5.2 Estimation Results and Discussion
Estimation results of the Cox regressions for both models are summarized
in Table 3. Both coefficients and standard errors are presented. As refer-
ence categories the categories with the highest fraction are used (competence
spin-off, single academic subject profile, technological services). Between the
two models the coefficients considerably change neither in magnitude nor
in significance which indicates that the violation of the proportional hazard
assumption in model A was not severe.
Both hypotheses stated in section 3 can be supported by the data. The
hazard ratio for the team dummy is exp(0.205) = 1.23. This means that
7Because student and method-based spin-off are binary, four combinations appear and
the model allows four different baseline hazards.
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the hazard increases by 23% if the spin-off is founded by a team instead
of a single founder. Hence the time lag is considerably shorter for spin-offs
established by a team of founders. Significant positive effects of two of the
subject combination dummies show that the time-lag is highest for those who
studied one single subject, which is the reference category. Combinations
like natural science with engineering or business have considerably higher
hazards, i.e. the probability that the spin-off establishment takes place is
higher for those combinations than for a single founder at any point in time.
The hazard increases by 24 percent or 23 percent, respectively, compared
to those spinoffs which were founded without subject combinations. These
effects support the assumption that complementarities in skills are present
and notably relevant in the establishment process of academic spin-offs.
In addition to acquiring complementary skills by team formation the pos-
itive effect of teams on transfer speed can also be explained by the pooling of
financial resources and risk-sharing among the team members both of which
reduce the risk faced by the individual founder.
Furthermore a research-based transfer spin-off has a hazard which is
exp(0.140) − 1 = 15% higher than the hazard of a competence spin-off. A
spin-off with a higher intensity of technology transfer is therefore established
more ”quickly”. This supports Hypothesis 2.
Further, the coefficients of the control variables reveal some interesting
insights. Among potential motivations for the spin-off establishments, the
motive to work independently and making one’s own decisions speeds up
establishment, which is quite intuitive. The hazard for founders driven by this
motivation was about 25% higher. Likewise the motivation to take promising
economic opportunities provided by research results has a positive influence
on the technology transfer speed. Those who were motivated by the economic
potential provided by research results have a hazard which is 12% higher.
This motivation might accompany the findings about the effects of transfer
intensity.
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Table 3: Cox Regression on the time-gap
(1) (2)
Model A Model B
coefficient standard
error
coefficient standard
error
research-based TSO 0.171 ** (0.073) 0.140 * (0.074)
method-based TSO1) 0.088 (0.059) – –
team 0.199 *** (0.054) 0.205 *** (0.054)
student -0.452 *** (0.064) – –
economic potential 0.116 * (0.059) 0.113 * (0.060)
self-determined working 0.235 *** (0.090) 0.222 ** (0.091)
income -0.024 (0.050) -0.017 (0.050)
career 0.032 (0.085) 0.042 (0.086)
demand 0.010 (0.048) 0.007 (0.048)
courses 0.171 (0.107) 0.150 (0.107)
infrastructure 0.388 *** (0.124) 0.324 *** (0.124)
advisory 0.065 (0.125) 0.030 (0.125)
contacts -0.124 (0.108) -0.115 (0.108)
colleagues 0.461 *** (0.077) 0.432 *** (0.078)
nat & engin 0.231 * (0.129) 0.214 * (0.130)
nat & business 0.208 * (0.116) 0.203 * (0.117)
engin & business -0.254 * (0.150) -0.232 (0.152)
other combination2) 0.040 (0.076) 0.055 (0.077)
cutting edge technology -0.146 (0.102) -0.154 (0.102)
high technology -0.263 ** (0.111) -0.273 ** (0.111)
software 0.337 *** (0.092) 0.322 *** (0.092)
knowledge intensive services -0.097 * (0.055) -0.100 * (0.056)
other manufacturing3 -0.421 *** (0.109) -0.421 *** (0.110)
N 1810 1810
Log likelihood -11755 -9745
χ2 296 146
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
1) reference category: competence spin-off, 2) reference category: single academic
subject profile 3) reference category: technological services
Source: ZEW Spin-Off Survey 2001, author’s calculations.
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Concerning the support received from academic institutions, significant
influence can be found for infrastructure support and encouragement by col-
leagues and professors. While the provision of infrastructure influences the
time-lag substantially, the encouragement of colleagues, which is more a soft-
kind support, is even more important for the acceleration of technology trans-
fer through academic spin-offs. The provision of infrastructure increases the
hazard by 38% while encouragement of colleagues increases the hazard by
54%.
These two kinds of university support differ materially. Support of infrastruc-
ture is an institutionalized assistance and positive effects on transfer speed
are quite obvious as start-up costs are reduced substantially when existing
infrastructure can be utilized. The explanation for the rather large effect of
encouragement of colleagues and professors is not that obvious. The results
of the empirical analysis suggests that psychologic factors such as peer sup-
port and climate effects are rather important in the start-up decision process.
First, encouragement of colleagues helps opportunity identification. Some-
body who has never thought about being self-employed will need much more
time to recognize his research results or skills as having the potential to be
commercialized by the establishment of a new firm. The idea that his former
scientific work provides the basis for a business idea might not show itself
until the researcher has gained some market experience. If the scientist got
in contact with some ”spirit of entrepreneurship”during his time at academia
this recognition process will be substantially accelerated. In this context col-
leagues act as guides.
Second, support from colleagues means professional assistance, too. Besides
the possible acceleration of the opportunity identification process by support
from colleagues, the founder knows that she can fall back on the knowledge
of former colleagues on an informal basis.
The sector dummies show that there are also substantial technology trans-
fer speed differences between the sectors. Academic spin-offs operating in the
software industry are established closest to the time being in academia. To
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explain that result one has to remember that all spin-offs in the sample had
been established between 1996 and 2000, the time of the ”New Economy
boom”. During that time it was rather easy for firms in information tech-
nologies, especially for software-firms, to find an investor and receive funding.
A fact which accelerates foundation substantially.
As the variable method-based transfer spin-off is insignificant in model
A, no valuable information is lost by using this covariate as stratification
criteria in model B. But model A indicates that the academic status of the
founder when he obtained the results or skills, which have been essential for
the business idea, has a significant impact on transfer speed. If the founder
was not a researcher but a student, the hazard is about 36% lower in model A.
The time-lag is thus longer for ”students only” founders.8 This result is quite
intuitive as students and graduates, which have never worked in an research
institution, have not spent as much time in science as researchers. Hence
”students only” founders must use market experience as a substitute for the
experiences a researcher could gain in academia. Although the stratified Cox
regression cannot give a precise estimate about the magnitude of the effect
of the academic status, a comparison of the estimated cumulative baseline
hazards supports the the findings of model A. The cumulative baseline hazard
of researchers lies above the cumulative baseline hazard of establishments
which are made only by students and graduates (see appendix A).
As a goodness of fit measure an evaluation based on Cox-Snell residuals
(Cox and Snell, 1968) was used.9 For both models a good fit could be ob-
served (see appendix B), but the unstratified model (model A) has a slightly
better fit than the stratified model (model B).
8The lower the risk of ”failure” the longer the time between leaving academia and
establishment.
9For models which fit the data well the Cox-Snell residuals ought to have a standard
exponential distribution with a hazard function of one for all t. Accordingly the cumulative
hazard of the Cox-Snell residuals should form a straight 45 degree line. The cumulative
hazard function of the Cox-Snell residuals is usually estimated using the Nelson-Aalen
estimator.
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6 Conclusions
This paper focuses on the phenomenon that a large amount of technology
transfer by means of academic spin-off creation is done years after the respec-
tive founders had left the academic institution. A fact which was in general
known but ignored in the existing spin-off literature. This ”late” technology
and knowledge transfer is not unimportant. New academic research results,
methods or skills obtained by founders in research and knowledge intensive
industries had been indispensable for the creation of the spin-off even more
than ten years after the institution was left. Policy makers should therefore
not only concentrate on direct spin-off activity but also develop appropriate
programmes for academic persons who first acquired complementary compe-
tencies such as market experience.
The empirical analysis shows that skill complementarities are likely to
be present in the spin-off establishment process. This conclusion is drawn
from both the fact that the time-lag of spin-off establishments in teams is
shorter than the time-lag of single founders and from the positive effect that
certain combinations of academic subjects have on transfer speed. As team
foundations have significantly shorter time-lags, a good matching of potential
founders with persons with a complementary skill profile can foster spin-off
creation. Policy makers as well as technology transfer offices should take that
into account and offer assistance in the matching process.
Additionally, the intensity of technology transfer appears to speed up the
transfer process due to a smaller ”window of opportunity”. For example,
because of potential imitation, spin-offs with a high intensity of technology
transfer were established earlier than those with a low intensity of knowledge
transfer.
The positive influence of university infrastructure support and support
from colleagues and professors on transfer speed give further suggestions to
policy makers on how to encourage direct spin-off establishment. While more
formal support by means of providing infrastructure helps to speed up spin-
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off formation, ”peer support” by means of encouragement of colleagues and
professors is also crucial factor for the time-dimension in the spin-off process.
As this paper assumes that the founders acquire complementary skills
in the time between academia and spin-off formation it would be interest-
ing for further research to know which competencies exactly can be termed
complements. Is market experience, management experience or professional
research experience in commerce of higher relevance? What are the influences
of general life experience and periods of unemployment? Furthermore, the
reasons for very long time-lags, such as time-lags of more than ten years, and
the consequences of such long time-lags on firm-performance can be investi-
gated. Thus, a lot of open questions concerning the time-lag remain which
should be addressed in the future.
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Figure 2: Cumulative baseline hazards if method-based transfer spin-off = 0
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Figure 3: Cumulative baseline hazards if method-based transfer spin-off = 1
Source: ZEW Spin-Off Survey 2001, author’s calculations.
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Figure 4: Goodness of fit model A
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Figure 5: Goodness of fit model B (stratified model)
Source: ZEW Spin-Off Survey 2001, author’s calculations.
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Table 4: Industry Classification: knowledge-intensive industries
NACE
Rev.1
Description
Cutting Edge Technology Industries
2330 Processing of nuclear fuel
2420 Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products
2441 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products
2461 Manufacture of explosives
2911 Manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines
2960 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition
3002 Manufacture of computers and other information processing equipment
3162 Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c.
3210 Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components
3220 Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy
3320 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other
purposes, except industrial process control equipment
3330 Manufacture of industrial process control equipment
3530 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft
High Technology Industries
2233 Reproduction of computer media
2411 Manufacture of industrial gases
2412 Manufacture of dyes and pigments
2413 Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals
2414 Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals
2417 Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms
2430 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics
2442 Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations
2462 Manufacture of glues and gelatines
2463 Manufacture of essential oils
2464 Manufacture of photographic chemical material
2466 Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c.
2912 Manufacture of pumps and compressors
2913 Manufacture of taps and valves
2914 Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements
2931 Manufacture of agricultural tractors
2932 Manufacture of other agricultural and forestry machinery
2940 Manufacture of machine tools
2952 Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction
2953 Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing
2954 Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather production
2955 Manufacture of machinery for paper and paperboard production
2956 Manufacture of other special purpose machinery n.e.c.
3001 Manufacture of office machinery
3110 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers
3140 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries
3150 Manufacture of lighting equipment and electrical lamps
3230 Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and
associated goods
3310 Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances
3340 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment
3410 Manufacture of motor vehicles
3430 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines
3520 Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock
Technology-Intensive Services
642 Telecommunications
72 Computer and related activities (722: Software)
731 Research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering
742 Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy
743 Technical testing and analysis Non-Technical Consulting Services
2224 Pre-press activities
7133 Renting of office machinery and equipment, including computers
9211 Motion picture and video production
45114 Disaggregation of repositories
30
NACE
Rev.1
Description
45120 Test drilling and boring
51146 Trade negotiation of office machines and software
51477 Wholesaling of precision and optical instruments and photographic equipment
51641 Wholesaling of office machines and software
52484 Retailing of precision and optical instruments and photographic equipment, computers and software
74201 Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy
74704 Disinfection and pest control
74812 Photographic laboratories
74841 Fair and exhibition facilities
74844 Design studios
90009 Land reclamation and recultivation
91331 Education, science, research and culture organisations
92202 Production of radio and television programme
92324 Recording Studios
92325 Technical services for cultural and sustentative services
92522 Monument conservation
Knowledge-intensive services
732 Research and experimental development on social sciences and humanities
7411 Legal activities
7412 Accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy
7413 Market research and public opinion polling
7414 Business and management consultancy activities
744 Advertising
2214 Publishing of sound recordings
2215 Other publishing
6713 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation n.e.c.
67203 Activities auxiliary to insurance and pension funding
74208 Business related technical consulting
74832 Translation activities
74842 Experts n.e.c.
74848 Supply of business related services n.e.c.
80422 Adult education
80424 Education a.n.g.
85144 Other self-employment in health care
92401 News agency activities
92521 Museums activities and art exhibitions
Remark: Differentiation according to the classification NACE Rev. 1 of the Statistical Office of the European Communities.
Source: Based on Egeln et al. (2003b), Grupp and Legler (2000)
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